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NOTES
Charitable Exemption from Ad Valorem Taxation
in Texas
1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BASIS FOR EXEMPTION
Although the constitution of 1876 provides that taxation of all
property in Texas shall be equal and uniform,' it gives the legislature
the power to exempt from taxation certain enumerated types of
property,' including "institutions of purely public charity."3 The
constitution, however, renders null and void all laws exempting prop-
erty other than that listed,' and for this reason it has been held con-
sistently that the legislature is strictly limited' and may not institute
exemptions which are not permitted by the constitution.! The legis-
lature exercised its constitutional power in 1876 by enacting a statute
exempting charitable institutions," which, in its amended form, is
now embodied in article 7150, section 7.' Subsequently, the legis-
lature enacted sections 14' and 20l0 of article 7150, which exempt
societies of fine arts and organizations created for the preservation
of historical buildings, respectively.
Because exemption is the antithesis of equality and uniformity in
taxation, all legislative exemptions are subject to the rule of strict
construction." An organization seeking exemption must place itself
clearly within both the constitutional and the statutory grants in
order to be exempt." Any doubt as to the validity of the exemption
'Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 2.
2Ibid.
' The portion of Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 2 which grants the charitable exemptions is
read by the courts as saying, "But the Legislature may, by general laws, exempt from taxa-
tion . . . all buildings used exclusively and owned by . . . institutions of purely public
charity." City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n, 11 Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978,
980 (1921).
' Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 2 states that "all laws exempting property from taxation other
than the property above mentioned shall be null and void."
'St. Edward's College v. Morris, 82 Tex. 1, 17 S.W. 512 (1891).
o Dickison v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 280 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955) error ref.
7Texas Acts 1876, ch. CLVII, § 5, 8 Gammel, Laws of Texas 276 (1876).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 7150, 5 7 (1959).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7150, 5 14 (1959).
'°Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7150, § 20 (1959).
" City of Wichita Falls v. Cooper, 170 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.;
City of San Antonio v. YMCA, 285 S.W. 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) error ref.
"City of Longview v. Markham-McRee Memorial Hospital, 137 Tex. 178, 152 S.W.2d
1112 (1941); City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n, 111 Tex. 191, 230 S.W.
978 (1921); Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, Royal Arch Masons, 68 Tex. 698, 5 S.W.
519 (1887).
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is resolved against exemption. 3 Strict construction, however, should
not be applied in such an inflexible manner that it thwarts the inten-
tion of the framers of the constitution and the legislature. 4 To guard
against this possibility, many jurisdictions have applied a strict rule
in determining whether a legislative grant is within the intent of
the constitutional framers, but have taken a more liberal approach in
determining whether a particular organization is of the character em-
braced by the statutes. Texas, however, has rejected this method."
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF EXCLUSIVE USE
One of the first cases to construe the constitutional provisions for
charitable exemptions was Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, Royal
Arch Masons.'" The court denied an exemption because the organiza-
tion rented part of the building it owned, even though the rents
received thereon were devoted to charity. In reaching this decision,
the court examined the Ohio constitutional provision exempting
charitable institutions, upon which the Texas provision was patterned,
and Gerke v. Purcell," an Ohio case construing that provision. Ohio
courts repeatedly had held that a rental of the charitable premises
destroyed the exemption; Texas followed this construction in the
Morris case.'" The court also stated that it is unnecessary to determine
whether the nature of the organization claiming exemption is charit-
able if it is engaged in rental of property, because that fact alone
renders it nonexempt.'
The 1905 amendment to section 7 of article 71500 appeared to
"Hedgecroft v. City of Houston, 150 Tex. 654, 244 S.W.2d 632 (1951); City of
Longview v. Markham-McRee Memorial Hospital, supra note 12.
'"City of Abilene v. State, 113 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
'"City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n, 111 Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978
(1921); Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, Royal Arch Masons, 68 Tex. 698, 5 S.W. 519
(1887). Whether the organization itself is within the intention of the constitutional framers
and the legislature is subject to the rule of strict construction.
'" 68 Tex. 698, 5 S.W. 519 (1887).
1725 Ohio St. 229 (1874).
" 68 Tex. at 702, 5 S.W. at 520.
o If it can be shown that property belonging to a charitable association, not
directly and exclusively used by it in furtherance of its charitable purposes,
but partly rented for profit though its resources be exclusively devoted to the
objects of charity is not exempt from taxation in our state, it will be unneces-
sary to determine whether or not appellee can be deemed an "institution of
purely public charity," as those words are used in our constitution. Id. at 700,
5 S.W. at 519.
The court again emphasized this rule, stating: "This is decisive of the litigation and renders
it unnecessary that we should pass upon the question whether appellee is an 'institution of
purely public charity' within the meaning of the Constitution." Id. at 705, 5 S.W. at 522.
"°The statute originally exempted "all buildings belonging to institutions of purely
public charity, together with the lands belonging to and occupied by such institutions, not
leased or otherwise used with a view to profit, and all moneys and credits appropriated solely
to sustaining such institutions." Texas Acts 1876, ch. CLVII, § 5, 8 Gammel, Laws of Texas
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give a more liberal effect to the statute with respect to exclusive use
than did the prior form and the decisions under it."5 A few lower
courts interpreted the amendment to exempt the institution itself,
rather than only the buildings owned and used exclusively by it."
City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n' dispelled this
interpretation, however, by holding that partial use of the building
owned by the Benevolent Association by two Masonic Chapters de-
feated the claim for exemption. The court held that even though no
rent was charged, a partial use by an organization not the owner of
the building for purposes which were not altogether charitable de-
stroyed the exemption. Though usually cited together as holding that
any use by one not the owner defeats exemption,' the holdings of
the Morris and Scottish Rite cases are distinct.2s Morris holds that
partial use by a nonowner for any purpose is prohibited if rent is
paid. Scottish. Rite holds that the exemption is destroyed if one not
the owner uses the premises for noncharitable purposes whether or
276 (1876). The 1905 amendment added after the phrase, "not leased or otherwise used
with a view to profit," the words, "unless such rents and profits and all moneys and credits
are appropriated by such institutions solely to sustain such institutions." Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art. 7150, S 7 (1959).
21 Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio, 259 S.W. 926, 931 (Tex. Comm. App.
1924).
12State v. Settegast, 227 S.W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), tev'd, 254 S.W. 925, (Tex.
Comm. App. 1923); Scott v. All Saints Hospital, 203 S.W. 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
The effect of such an interpretation would be to exempt the institution whether or not it
was carrying on charitable activities at the time, or if charitable activities were being carried
on, to do away with the requirement of exclusive use. For example, in State v. Settegast,
supra, the property in question consisted of an estate bequeathed in trust for the purpose of
erecting and maintaining a hospital. At the time taxes were assessed against the property
the hospital had not been constructed, but all income from the property was being accu-
mulated for this purpose. The court of civil appeals interpreted the amended statute as
granting exemption in such situations. Shortly thereafter, the supreme court decided City of
Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n, 111 Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978 (1921), which
interpreted the amendment more strictly. The commission of appeals then followed Scottish
Rite and reversed in the Settegast case. See the discussion of the Scottish Rite case in text
accompanying notes 23 through 27 infra.
23il Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978 (1921).
"4 City of Longview v. Markham-McRee Memorial Hospital, 137 Tex. 178, 152 S.W.2d
1112 (1941); David Graham Hall Foundation v. Highland Park Independent School Dist.,
371 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref. n.r.e.
'Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio, 259 S.W. 926 (Tex. Comm. App.
1924), contains an explanation of the holdings of the Morris and Scottish Rite cases:
But as the constitution requires the property, as a prerequisite to its right to
exemption, to be exclusively used by the charitable institution, it is apparent
that if any part of it is rented out and the relation of landlord and tenant
created, that very fact would necessarily destroy the exclusive use necessary
to be retained by the owner to bring its property within the plain terms of
the Constitution, and it has been therefore held, as it was in [the Morris]
. . . case and in State v. Settegast . . . that the leasing of all or any part of a
charitable institution's property to those not themselves engaged in a wholly
charitable work, or the occupancy of even a part of the property by others
under what amounts to an equivalent situation [citing Scottish Rite] . . .
destroys the exempt character of the property, and it is plain that in those
cases there could have been no other holding. Id. at 931, 932.
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not rent is paid for such use." Despite sweeping statements implying
that even free use by a nonowner whose purposes are charitable will
destroy the exemption," there has been no direct holding to this effect.
III. INSTITUTIONS OF PURELY PUBLIC CHARITY
The constitution does not define the phrase "institutions of purely
public charity" in its exemption provision. Furthermore, no statutory
definition existed until the 1905 amendment of the implementing
statute. The amendment, carried through to section 7 of article 7150,
included the following definition:
An institution of purely public charity under this article is one which
dispenses its aid to its members and others in sickness or distress, or at
death, without regard to poverty or riches of the recipient, also when
the funds, property and assets of such institutions are placed and bound
by its laws to relieve, and administer in any way to the relief of its
members when in want, sickness and distress, and provide homes for
its helpless and dependent members and to educate and maintain the
orphans of its deceased members or other persons."
An interesting question is whether this statute is an exclusive defini-
tion of the constitutional term "institution of purely public charity."
Evidently, the legislature does not feel that section 7 is exclusive be-
cause in subsequent sections it grants numerous exemptions which do
not fit the section 7 definition and which apparently have no con-
stitutional basis other than the public charity provision.
The courts have made only feeble attempts to define the constitu-
tional phrase, "institutions of purely public charity." In Scottish
26 That the Scottish Rite case is so restricted is illustrated by the fact that the court
examined the nature of the Masonic chapters before determining the exclusive use issue.
Had the rule been as broad as sometimes construed, the court could have decided the case
without such a consideration because, as held in Morris, use by a nonowner would have
been decisive. See note 19 supra.
" See cases cited note 24 supra.
"sTex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1901, ch. 127, § 6. This amendment to the 1876 statute is
now embodied in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7150, § 7 (1959).
Use of the word members is conspicuous in § 7. Legislative history of the bill, which
might explain the emphasis given the word, is not available. Clearly the word "member"
is not meant to limit recipients to that class. It is more likely that the word was placed
in the statute to answer the question of whether an institution would qualify for exemption
if its members were the primary recipients of the charitable benefits. This question was
raised and answered affirmatively by the supreme court. City of Houston v. Scottish Rite
Benevolent Ass'n, III Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978, 981 (1921). However, even though charity
is limited mainly to members of the organization, there still must be a substantial public
benefit. Id. at 981.
" The Constitution provides that only public property, religious property, places of
burial, educational property, and institutions of charity may be exempted. Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art. 7150 (1959) exempts, among other things, art galleries, 5 14, Texas Federa-
tion of Women's Clubs, § 19, American Legion and other veteran's organizations, S 20.
NOTES
Rite," the supreme court stated that an organization must meet
three criteria in order to be such an institution: it (1) must make no
gain or profit, (2) must accomplish ends wholly benevolent, and (3)
must benefit persons indefinite in number by preventing them from
becoming burdens on the community or state.3 The court suggested
further that a charity would be "public" if it affected all the people
of the community or state by assuming to a material extent that
which otherwise might become the obligation or duty of the com-
munity or state." This was the first appearance in Texas of the
quid pro quo theory of exemption. The importance of the quid pro
quo standard was lessened, however, when the case ultimately was
decided on the basis of exclusive use.
In Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio" the court ex-
amined section 7 much more closely than in any previous case and
interpreted it as requiring that: (1) dispensation of the relief must
be without regard to the poverty or riches of the recipients and (2)
the property or assets of the charity must be bound by its laws to
dispense aid to persons in time of need."' Apparently the court as-
sumed that the Infirmary met the constitutional requirement of a pub-
lic charity. Nevertheless, it is significant that after holding that Santa
Rosa Infirmary qualified under section 7, the court further justified
the exemption by stating that the hospital relieved the state of a
portion of its duty to provide for the indigent sick."
Thus, until 1963, the phrase "institution of purely public charity"
was not clearly defined in its constitutional sense. The quid pro quo
idea was present in the law, but it had never been applied as the sole
criterion in determining the tax status of an organization claiming
exemption. Probably because of the strict requirement of exclusive
use, the courts rarely had been confronted with cases that turned
purely on the definition of charity.
IV. RIVER OAKS GARDEN CLUB V. CITY OF HOUSTON"
River Oaks Garden Club brought suit to have its property de-
clared exempt, under sections 14 and 20 of article 7150, from ad
valorem taxes assessed by the City of Houston. River Oaks Garden




"Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio, 259 S.W. 926 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
34ld. at 935.
"1 Ibid.
3" Tex. -, 370 S.W.2d 851 (1963).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7150, §§ 14, 20 (1959).
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Club is a nonprofit corporation whose declared purpose is to promote
education in the field of gardening and related fine arts and to pre-
serve a historical building known as the Old Smith County School.
Other nonprofit organizations used the building without change at
various times"8 to hold meetings. The district court declared the
property exempt. The court of civil appeals reversed because the
property was not used exclusively by the owner. 9 In a five to four
decision, the supreme court affirmed on other grounds, holding that
the organization was not an institution of purely public charity
within the constitutional meaning of that phrase because it did not
assume to a material extent that which otherwise might become the
obligation or duty of the community or state." In accepting the quid
pro quo standard of the Scottish Rite case, the majority pointed out
that this definition did not arise from a statutory interpretation of
the phrase "institution of purely public charity" in section 7 of
article 7150, but rather was a definition of that phrase as it is used
in the constitution.41
River Oaks contains language to the effect that River Oaks Garden
Club came within section 14, which exempts societies of fine arts,
and section 20, which exempts, among other things, organizations set
up for the preservation of historical buildings. 4' There is further
language in the opinion to the effect that the activities carried on by
River Oaks Garden Club were not activities which the state or com-
munity are under an obligation to finance.4" Such findings would
seem to require a holding that the legislature exceeded its authority
in enacting sections 14 and 20, which exempt organizations carry-
ing on such activities, and thus, that those sections are unconstitu-
tional as applied to River Oaks Garden Club. The court, however,
bypassed the constitutional question, apparently feeling that it was
unnecessary to go this far.
Though the opinion does not specifically so state, the result of
this case seems to have been reached through a factual determination
"Some of the organizations using the building without charge were, The Houston Sym-
phony Society Women's Council, The Amarylis Society, The African Violet Society, and
The Gulf Coast Botanican Research Society. 370 S.W.2d at 855.
"9360 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
40370 S.W.2d at 854.
41 Ibid.
42 "[P]etitioner has sought, in clear language, to bring its property within the exemp-
tions of secs. 14 and 20. . . . For purposes of this opinion we may assume it has done so.
However, if its exemption is not authorized by the Constitution, it has done so to no avail."
Id. at 852, 853.
4"[Petitioner's] . . . activity may be one which the state or local government could
finance from taxes, . . . but it is certainly not an activity which either the state or local
government is under a duty or an obligation to finance in providing educational opportunities
and benefits to its society." Id. at 855, 856.
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that River Oaks Garden Club was benefitting primarily its member-
ship rather than the public at large." By placing emphasis here, and
by refusing to determine the constitutionality of sections 14 and 20,
the court may have been indicating that the nature of the activities
contemplated by those sections might meet the quid pro quo standard
if they benefit a sufficiently large number of the public. It is clear
that benefit to a substantial segment of the public is required of a
charitable institution no matter what activity the organization en-
gages in. The distinction between membership and the public at
large, however, is new. This is the first case in which a charity has
been denied exemption because the benefits ran primarily to its mem-
bers. Admittedly, the membership of the garden club reaped most of
the benefits, but the opinion does not state that the membership at-
tempted to frustrate public participation-the corporate charter
showed an intent to benefit the public,"5 the public was invited to the
club's meetings and those of other organizations using the premises,
and the Old Smith County School was open to the public." If in fact
no public benefit was conferred it would seem to be because there
was not a large following of the club's activities, not because the club
intended to limit its benefits to the members. Under these facts a
section 7 institution presumably would gain exemption."7 Thus, there
appear to be two factors which the court will examine in determining
whether a particular organization attempting to qualify under sec-
tions 14 and 20 meets the quid pro quo standard: (1) whether the
activity itself is one which the state or community has an obligation
to support and (2) the extent to which the organization lessens that
obligation. It would seem from River Oaks that if the class benefitted
is small, the court will require a clearer showing that the organiza-
tion has assumed an important governmental obligation than if the
4' Admittedly, its main activity is to educate and enlighten its members, and such
other persons as care to attend its meetings or read its book, in the art of
growing and arranging flowers. . . If petitioner may claim tax exemption
as a[n] . . . 'institution of purely public charity,' there can be no end of
exemptions accorded clubhouses and meeting places owned by small groups of
persons of common aesthetic interests who associate themselves to promote and
enjoy their particular interests. Id. at 855.45 Id. at 852.
41Id. at 855.
" Justification for this sliding scale approach to §§ 14 and 20 organizations may be
found in the language of the exempting statutes. Though §5 7, 14, and 20 do not specif-
ically require that the activities of the organization be carried on for the public benefit, this
is a constitutional requirement that has been superimposed on these sections by the courts.
The legislature, however, has stated in § 7 that "members" may be the sole recipients of
the benefit, and the supreme court has stated that the public is benefitted by a § 7 society
even if it provides only for the welfare of its members. See note 28 supra. The word
"members," however, is not present in §5 14 and 20. This could well mean that the legis-
lature did not intend to exempt section 14 and 20 institutions if the members receive the
greatest share of the benefits. If so, the courts are powerless to do so.
NOTES1964]
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benefits run to a large segment of the public. The converse of this
test also may be true; viz., if the institution assumes a function which
benefits the community, even though this activity is not clearly an
obligation of the government, exemption may be given if the bene-
fits provided by the organization reach a substantial portion of the
public.
V. CONCLUSION
The River Oaks decision is significant in two respects. First, it
avoids the issue of exclusive use. Silence on this question may indi-
cate that a charitable institution will not lose its exemption if it
allows other charities to use its facilities free of charge. Such a rule
carries out the intent of the constitution and statutes to promote
charitable activities better than does a rule which deprives an institu-
tion of its exemption simply because it aids other charitable institu-
tions in carrying on their activities by allowing them free use of its
premises. This interpretation of the court's silence, however, is purely
conjectural. The court raised the element of exclusive use and stated
that it is still a requirement."8 Nevertheless, it refused to apply this
standard, stating that the definitional aspect was more fundamental
to the decision.
The second significant aspect of the decision is the adoption of the
narrow quid pro quo standard of charitable exemptions, with its
attendant ambiguities, as a constitutional criterion in determining
whether an organization is an institution of purely public charity.
River Oaks is unclear as to whether gardening, preservation of his-
torical landmarks, and similar activities ever may be considered charit-
able under the quid pro quo standard. The most strict interpretation
of the case is that many activities beneficial to the community, and
normally considered to be "charitable," will be denied exemption be-
cause they do not assume an obligation that must otherwise be financed
by tax dollars.4 As discussed above, it is probable that the quid
pro quo standard will not be applied in such a strict manner. Never-
theless, the decision stirs up an already murky area of law and until
it is clarified, many organizations operating as valid charitable institu-
48370 S.W.2d at 853.
"' It is interesting to note that the budget for the City of Dallas includes an allocation
for "Sundry Charges" described as "Expenses legally or morally obligatory upon the City
as a public corporation." (Emphasis added.) Some expenses listed as Sundry Charges are the
following: Historical Society, Dallas Art Museum, Health Museum, and Garden Center.
City of Dallas General Budget for Fiscal Year 1963-1964, p. 229.
The budget for the City of New York for the same year shows allocations of approxi-
mately 4.5 million dollars for botanical gardens, zoological societies, and historical and art
museums. New York Times, April 16, 1963, p. 26.
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tions may find a harsher climate in future dealings with the tax
assessor. River Oaks easily might be seen by the assessors as authority
for cracking down on organizations which, though plainly altruistic,
do not provide benefits in areas that fall within the traditional defini-
tion of public welfare. Such organizations probably will find it even
more difficult to justify exemption if they benefit a comparatively
small number of people.
The generally broadening areas of government assistance makes an
enumeration of what is and what is not the obligation of the com-
munity or state difficult. In applying River Oaks, the assessor must
be governed by his own opinion of what constitutes that obligation.
He may find help, however, from language in the opinion which
shows an apparent antipathy toward gardening, dramatics, and in-
terior decorating.0 Moreover, many organizations, presently claiming
exemption, whose values lie in the fields of arts and sciences, and
whose esoteric natures do not attract a wide following, might be met
with similar antipathy. Under the present test these organizations
face the prospect of harrassment and loss of tax exempt status which
has previously been taken for granted.
The trend in other jurisdictions appears to be toward a broader
definition of charity, exemption being based on public utility and
social desirability rather than assumption of state or municipal duty
to a massive extent. If River Oaks is applied literally, Texas will be
rejecting that trend. Even if the courts interpret the quid pro quo
standard liberally, the uncertainty which pervades the criteria for
charitable exemptions in Texas will work a hardship on institutions in
the fringe area. In most cases one should be able to look to the con-
stitution and the exempting statutes to determine whether a particular
organization qualifies for exemption. The present law, however, is
so encumbered with small distinctions concerning exclusive use, the
activities considered charitable, and the extent to which the public
must be benefitted that, except in extreme cases, it is impossible to
determine exemption status without the courts' help. It is hoped
that this morass will be clarified when the court again is confronted
with a charitable exemption case.
John L. Primmer
50370 S.W.2d at 856.
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